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“Either everyone was guilty or everyone was innocent”i: The Italian Power Elite, 
neopatrimonialism and the importance of social relations. 
 
Abstract 
 
Rarely does the Byzantine world of football administration get exposed as clearly as 
during the 2006 calciopoli scandal. This scandal laid bare the interpersonal 
relationships of football administrators at the top three Italian men’s football clubs: 
Juventus; Inter and AC Milan. This article draws on the media leaks that revealed the 
inner workings of those working within football to argue that the football clubs are 
pyramids of power for club presidents that allows them to operate within the Italian 
power elite. This is done through interpersonal clientelistic networks that operate 
within a neopatrimonial system. Theoretically, this article draws on four main 
concepts: C. Wright Mills’ (1956) concept of the Power Elite; Lomnitz’s (1982) model 
of ‘Pyramids of Power’; Eisenstadt’s (1973) notion of neopatrimonialism; and Mauss’ 
(1967) utilisation of the gift. Power is exercised through quid pro quo relationships, 
with certain key individuals operating as brokers to the flow of favours throughout 
the network.  
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The 2006 calciopoli scandal in Italian football will be analysed throughout this article in 
order to demonstrate the neopatrimonial networks within Italian politics, business and 
football.  Briefly, the scandal came about through distinct investigations into match-fixing 
rings in Parma and Udine which coincided with investigations into match-fixing involving the 
Neapolitan organised crime syndicate, the Camorra. In parallel, separate investigations were 
taking place into a sports agency in Rome called GEA Sport, as well as an examination of 
potential doping at Juventus. The inherent problem of the system was initially highlighted 
six months earlier when the judicial inquiries were presented to the president of the 
football federation, Franco Carraro, who took no action. This resulted in the inquiries being 
leaked to the media. Although the scandal implicated all of the top three clubs, as well as 
Fiorentina and Lazio, the initial investigation centred on the director of football at Juventus, 
Luciano Moggi. He came to symbolise the personalised nature of the neopatrimonial system 
as he was situated at the nexus of a wide network of politicians, administrators, referees, 
and journalists. Moggi cultivated these contacts through a series of roles in Naples, Rome 
and Turin. The scandal resulted in Juventus, Italy’s most successful and well-supported club, 
being stripped of the 2005 and 2006 league titles and relegated. Meanwhile several of 
Italy’s other leading clubs, AC Milan, Fiorentina and Lazio, were docked points. Five years 
later the recriminations continued as the main beneficiary of calciopoli, Internazionale 
(‘Inter’), were identified as being complicit in the original allegations as their owner was a 
director of Telecom Italia that ordered the wire taps into Juventus and Milan, and a former 
Inter director became president of the league and quickly dispensed justice over their rivals. 
Political connections were vital in how power was exercised. 
 
Theoretically, this article draws on four main concepts: C. Wright Mills’ (1956) concept of 
the Power Elite; Lomnitz’s (1982) model of ‘Pyramids of Power’; Eisenstadt’s (1973) notion 
of neopatrimonialism; and Mauss’ (1967) utilisation of the gift. Each of these will be 
elaborated later and Figure 1 attempts to show this figuratively. Sitting atop Italian political 
society is the Power Elite comprised of three interlocked pyramids of power: politics; 
industry; and football. Individuals at the apex of these three pyramids constitute the Italian 
Power Elite. Whilst these pyramids may stand alone, at their summit are individuals who 
belong within each structure. Silvo Berlusconi embodied this structure as he is a successful 
businessman, previous owner of the football club AC Milan and former Prime Minister. 
Within each pyramid, neopatrimonial networks operate to exercise power. 
Neopatrimonialism is the corruption of bureaucratic systems for personal gain (Eisenstadt 
1973). These networks are constituted through social relations that are enacted through the 
quid pro quo exchange of favours. Mauss’ (1967) understanding of gift exchange will be 
used to demonstrate how key individuals use patronage and gift exchange within this 
neopatrimonial network. Gifts symbolise not only future obligations, but power within social 
relationships. The importance of using these concepts is that it breaks away from the notion 
that deregulation and privatisation of ownership automatically improves competition to a 
wider range of actors. This article will show that inter-personal connections can be used to 
corrupt and undermine political and economic integrity.  
 
  
Figure 1. Conceptual view of the Italian Power Elite 
 
This article addresses three aspects relevant to contemporary sociology. Firstly it seeks to 
show how football can be a key site for political domination and consequently an important 
site to understand how power can be exercised. Secondly, through analysis of transcripts of 
a major football scandal, calciopoli, it argues that power is exercised through personal 
relationships using gift exchange and patronage. Thirdly, it demonstrates how these 
interpersonal relationships form a widespread neopatrimonial network of that draws on 
these gifts and patronage in order to maintain the Power Elite. The Byzantine world of 
Italian politics is opaque and difficult to access. Yet through media publication of numerous 
transcripts of the calciopoli scandal, it is methodologically possible to see who exercises 
power, not only in analysis of the conversations, but through the way the carefully selected 
transcripts were leaked. Consequently, this article will interrogate only one pyramid of the 
Italian Power Elite. Despite this, it will still be possible to discern clear links with the other 
pyramids of the Power Elite, often because the same people are located within of all three 
pyramids. 
 
The Italian Power Elite 
 
 
Politics 
Football 
Business  
Inter Milan Juventus 
The Italian Power Elite 
 
In his analysis of the ‘Power Elite’ in American society, C. Wright Mills’ (1956) identified a 
confluence of individuals and groups at the apex of American society. Mills identified how 
power coalesced around certain institutions. In particular, the interests of politics, industry 
and the military were interlaced in post-war America. In many cases the same individuals 
would occupy strategic locations within government. This was reinforced by Eisenhower’s 
acknowledgment of the ‘Military-Industrial Complex’ to illustrate how business operated for 
the military with the support of the government. Individuals within these roles, Mills (1956: 
4) argued, 
 
‘are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or 
do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such 
pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act 
that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make’. 
 
Significantly, the Power Elite sat at the apex of the three institutions of power, the miltary, 
industry and politics. Whilst the military held, and continues to hold, a key position within 
American political life, this does not automatically translate to other nations. America 
retains a military presence within Italy, so the Italian military does not have such a strategic 
importance. Despite this, one can still see a convergence of political and industrial interests 
in Italy, where the military as the symbolic institution of physical power is replaced by 
football. 
 
 Silvio Berlusconi embodies the exercise of political power in Italy. He is a successful 
businessman who owns three of Italy’s four private television channels. In 1986 he 
purchased AC Milan football club and transformed their fortunes both on and off the pitch. 
Following the tangentopoli scandal in 1992, Berlusconi used his television channels to 
announce that he was ‘entering the field’ of politics. He established a political party called 
Forza Italia, which was named after a football chant, as well as drawing on football as a 
wider metaphor for politics (Porro and Russo, 2000). Drawing on the national popularity of 
football, Berlusconi simplified political language and communicated to a wider audience 
(Croci, 2001). Communicating in the language and emotion of the national-popular enables 
hegemony (Gramsci 1971).  
 
Moreover, Berlusconi is not unique in this combination of being a politically connected 
businessman who owns a football club (Author, 2015). Until 2013, Inter was owned by 
Massimo Moratti, who inherited his father’s oil business, and sat on the board of Pirelli and 
Telecom Italia. His sister-in-law, Letizia Moratti, was president of the state-owned television 
network, RAI, as well as being Mayor of Milan and a minister within a Berlusconi 
government. In Turin, the founders and owners of Fiat, the Agnelli family, has owned 
Juventus since 1923. Their former Fiat and Juventus president, Gianni Agnelli, was made a 
senator for life in 1991. Where Mills (1956) argued that America’s ‘power elite’ was based 
on dense personal connections between politics, business and the military, in Italy power is 
accumulated around politics, business and football. As in the case of Silvio Berlusconi, these 
can be embodied in one person. 
 
The hegemony of the Italian power elite between business, politics and football extends 
into football governance. Mills (1956: 4) argued that ‘the power elite are not solitary rulers. 
Advisers and consultants, spokesmen (sic) and opinion-makers are often the captains of 
their higher thought and decision.’ These include professional politicians, administrators, 
and celebrities. These act as brokers that work within their institution to uphold the power 
of the Power Elite. Until 2010, the Italian football league was regulated and administered by 
Lega Calcio whilst the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) ran the game. Franco Carraro, the 
president of the FIGC at the time of calciopoli, epitomises the game of musical chairs that 
takes place at various institutions. He had been president of the League on three separate 
occasions, in addition to being a former president of AC Milan, president of CONI (the Italian 
Olympic Organisation), member of UEFA’s executive committee, and president of the FIGC. 
In addition he was also a banker, a former mayor of Rome, minister of tourism for the 
Socialists and senator for Berlusconi’s political party. Elsewhere, Adriano Galliani, the vice-
president of Berlusconi’s AC Milan, was also president of Lega Calcio and member of the G-
14 lobbying group of most powerful clubs in Europe. There is a clear conflict of interest in 
being vice-president of a club and guarantor of the integrity of the league (Porro and Russo 
2004). Galliani was seriously implicated in the calciopoli scandal as AC Milan’s referee’s 
liaison officer, Leonardo Meani, was overheard speaking to Gennaro Mazzei, the head of 
assistant referees on several occasions. This was with the full approval of the club’s vice-
president Galliani. As the prosecutor Stefano Palazzi stated, ‘Meani was in telephone 
contact with linesmen, who were asked, when in doubt, to favour AC Milan. Galliani 
approved’ (Dunne, 2006). As a result, Galliani resigned his position as president of the 
league. When the Italian league was reconstituted in 2010, however, the Milan vice-
president was re-elected as a board member. As Gramsci (1971: 164) argued, hegemony 
works by ‘inserting the subordinate class into the key institutions and structures which 
support the power and social authority of the dominant order’. 
 
Pyramids of Power 
 
Mills (1956) under-theorised the finer details of the three dominant institutions in American 
society. Whilst Mills (1956) observed the interconnected relationships at the confluence of 
American political hierarchy, he effectively created an image of a dualistic society with the 
‘Power Elite’ at the top and ‘the Mass Society’ underneath. Although it is useful to see how 
certain key groups bestride positions of power, it is dangerous to create a simplistic dualism 
around a society of several million people. Calciopoli demonstrated how the Italian Power 
Elite exerted their interest through their football power bases. In order to illustrate the 
vertical hierarchies within each institution, Lomnitz’s (1982) use of the metaphor of the 
pyramid is instructive.  Lomnitz (1982: 52) argued that Mexican social structure is ‘a set of 
free-standing pyramids, each of which duplicates itself hierarchically like a crystal from top 
to bottom’. Fundamentally, these pyramids are institutionalised networks of relationships 
that operate in support of those at the peak. These informal relationships provide 
opportunities for reciprocal exchange that allows power to flow through the network 
(Lomnitz (1982). In this way, political stability is achieved. But more importantly, this 
stability ensures the elite groups remain in situ and others remain marginalised.  
 
Whereas Mills focussed on the elite politicians, military and industrialists, Lomnitz is focused 
on the hierarchies within four distinct pyramids or sectors: public; organised labour; private; 
and marginal labour. Consequently, she excludes the politicians that seem to sit above and 
outside these pyramids, whereas Mills’ theorisation ensures that politics is one of the 
primary institutions. Furthermore, the military is not an independent pyramid due to the 
marginal influence of the Mexican military. Combining Mills and Lomnitz provides the 
theoretical scaffolding for analysis of Calciopoli. Within Italian political society there exists a 
Power Elite that operate across Football, Politics and Industry.  Each of these institutions 
operate as a pyramid of power that provides a powerbase for the Power Elite. Whilst it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to provide in-depth analysis of Italian political hierarchies to 
reinforce the veracity of the power hierarchies within politics and industry, the Calciopoli 
scandal provide an important insight into how the reciprocal networks operate within the 
football pyramid.  
 
The analogy of the pyramid of power can be further subdivided; elite Italian football clubs 
represent distinct pyramids of power. They draw on the power and social connections of the 
owners and strategic individuals, and exert influence across their own neopatrimonial 
network. Just as Fiat and Benetton remain at the apex of a network of small family 
businesses in the style of the Emilan model (Piore and Sabel, 1984), provincial football clubs 
are under the influence of Juventus, Inter and Milan. The semi-powerful clubs of Roma, 
Lazio, Napoli, and Fiorentina sit slightly outside of the top three, but are still under their 
influence. The elite clubs have the resources to purchase the best players. The rules of 
football ensure that it is only a team of eleven players who can play. Although squad sizes 
have developed so that teams can compete in many competitions, they still need to develop 
their players. They often send them out on loan to a provincial club who temporarily gains a 
player of better quality, or on reduced wages. Shortly before calciopoli it was highlighted in 
the Italian media that there were a number of connections between Juventus and Siena 
(Richardson, 2006). This was reaffirmed during calciopoli as it became clear that Luciano 
Moggi was influencing the recruitment of players, not only through Juventus, but also 
through his son’s agency, GEA World, who controlled twenty percent of players in Italy. In 
2005 the former Siena midfielder, Stefano Argilli, was forced to leave the club because he 
refused to sign for GEA. He said that ‘Our new manager was GEA, our general manager was 
GEA, half the team was GEA. It was clear to me that if I wanted to stay, I would have to sack 
my agent and join GEA as well’ (Marcotti, 2006).  
 
Italy’s familial capitalism facilitates these neopatrimonial networks. This is exemplified by 
GEA World sports agency. Their list of shareholders reads like a catalogue of family 
members connected to the football world. Two shareholders, Andrea Cragnotti and 
Riccardo Calleri, were the children of former Lazio presidents. There were also connections 
to Parma as Francesca Tanzi was the sister of Calisto Tanzi who built and bankrupted 
Parmalat and their subsidiary football club. Capitalia, the bank that underwrote Parma’s 
debt, along with Lazio and Roma, was also an investor. They employed Franco Carraro, the 
former head of the Italian football federation who suppressed the original calciopoli report 
(Hamil et al., 2010). More fundamental to the scandal was the sons of two key figures at 
Juventus. Alongside Moggi’s son, Alessandro, was the son of a former head coach of 
Juventus and Italy’s World Cup winning side, Davide Lippi. This agency provided the crucial 
resource for accessing players, whilst the footballers themselves gained a greater chance of 
selection for the national team or Juventus.  
 
Calciopoli highlighted how separate pyramids of power were established at the elite three 
clubs. Even though the initial investigation centred on Juventus’ general manager, Luciano 
Moggi, he always maintained his innocence. As the quote used for the title of this article 
states, he argued that everyone was guilty. This echoed the same justification as Bettino 
Craxi, the former Prime Minister who was severely implicated in the tangentopoli scandal of 
1992. Although the rest of this article will highlight how Moggi acted as a broker within the 
Juventus neopatrimonial pyramid, the other two elite clubs were implicated. As highlighted 
earlier, AC Milan was found guilty of establishing their own power network centred on their 
referee’s liaison officer, Leonardo Meani, with the support of Adriano Galliani.  What was 
important about calciopoli was that Inter was the club that had the most to gain from the 
elimination of their two biggest rivals, yet they were untouched by the scandal initially. 
After the resignation of Galliani, a former senator and vice-president of Inter, Guido Rossi, 
took control of the league. His first task was to resolve the scandal quickly, which he did 
before becoming the new president of Telecom Italia. The telecommunications company 
was the institution that authorised the wiretaps for calciopoli. Coincidentally, Telecom Italia 
was presided over by the second largest shareholder at Inter, Marco Tronchetti Provera and 
Inter’s president, Massimo Moratti was also a director. Although Moggi exerted power 
through his network, he could not compete with the power in Inter’s pyramid.   
 It is important to reiterate that these pyramids are not solidified structures.  They are fluid 
and ebb and flow along with the resources available. Significantly they do not only operate 
vertically, as Lomnitz (1982: 66) argues: 
 
‘Flexibility and fluidity are thus provided by the individual networks of reciprocal 
exchange that informally cut across hierarchical boundaries between the sectors. 
These networks circulate resources from one pyramid to another... It becomes 
advantageous to have relatives or friends in all three sectors’.  
 
Certain individuals will be connected across all three clubs. It was alleged in calciopoli that 
Luciano Moggi had corrupted the referee designators, Paolo Bergamo and Pierluigi Pairetto, 
in order to gain compliant referees. In his defence, Moggi alleged that thousands of phone 
transcripts were not included in the original investigation and these showed that other clubs 
were in contact with Pairetto and Bergamo. Likewise, favours and influence will be 
dispensed horizontally. This was exposed during the financial crisis at the start of the 
twenty-first century. Clubs utilised an accounting measure called plus-valenze. This is where 
the profit made on the sale of players could be spread over an accounting term, ‘Sales are 
immediately entered into the accounts, whilst purchases are spread over the entire period 
of the contract [original italics]’ (Foot, 2006: 491). Traditionally this would benefit the 
smaller clubs but the larger clubs realized they could be creative with their accounting and 
transfer players between clubs at inflated prices. Several players were exchanged between 
the Milan clubs in the 1990s (La Corriere della Sera, 2008). Meanwhile, in 2004, Inter and 
Juventus exchanged for the same value (the future world cup winning captain) Fabio 
Cannavaro for a Uruguayan reserve goalkeeper (Foot, 2006). Inter effectively gave away 
their best player to their rivals. Gift exchange is an important part of negotiating power.  
 
Neopatrimonialism 
 
Max Weber (1968) identified patrimonialism as a form of political legitimation and 
domination alongside charismatic and legal-rational ideal-types. Patrimonial domination 
existed when a ruler provided favours and gifts to followers in return for their support. For 
Weber, the ruler was legitimated by tradition and used the institutions of state to dispense 
patronage upon his or her followers. The growth of modern bureaucracies and 
industrialisation transformed state institutions, yet this did not mean that patrimonialism 
ceased. Roth (1968) reintroduced the concept of patrimonialism by highlighting the role of 
‘personal rulership’ that continued within modern institutions. In order to clearly delineate 
Weber’s traditional patrimonialism from modern forms, Eisenstadt (1973) introduced the 
notion of neopatrimonialism. For Esienstadt this was a shift to a more bureaucratic, party 
orientated form of patronage that characterised the organisation of politics and its 
relationship with the periphery. Médard (1982) developed this notion and argued that 
neopatrimonialism was due to an underdeveloped state, with state institutions privatised in 
the hands of one ruler, rather than in the legal-rational bureaucracy. Yet if all power is 
consolidated in the hands of one ruler, then this is traditional patrimonialism, not 
neopatrimonialism. Mediterranean countries, however, exhibit continuity between tradition 
and modernity (Sapelli, 1995) so it is difficult to make a clear demarcation between 
traditional patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism.  
 
In reality, putative legal-rational structures exist and patrimonialism operates within these 
structures. Even the smallest state, however undeveloped, has bureaucratic institutions. As 
Clapham (1985: 48) argues, neopatrimonialism is ‘a form of organisation in which 
relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system 
which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines’. Like Médard, Clapham sees the state 
as a façade, which permits the state official to operate with personal authority outside of 
the legal-rational structure. This dual aspect of neopatrimonialism is also addressed by 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 62) who ‘characterise as neopatrimonial those hybrid 
regimes in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, 
rational-legal institutions’. Individuals dominate the institutions and shape laws and 
regulations according to personal authority. 
 
Consequently, neopatrimonialism is the relationship between patrimonial and legal-rational 
authority that emphasises the former and minimises the latter. Despite this, ‘not all political 
and administrative decisions are taken according to informal rules determined by private or 
personal interests’ (Erdmann and Engel, 2007: 104). In a neopatrimonial system, the 
patrimonial aspect dominates the other two ideal types. Under neopatrimonialism: 
 
‘Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practise the separation of the 
private and public sphere is not always observed… they permeate each other: the 
patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions and 
output, but does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic’ (Erdmann 
and Engel, 2007: 105). 
 
Neopatrimonialism is an interwoven concept between patrimonialism and legal-rational, 
but with focus on personal and informal relationships. The omission of Weber’s third ideal 
type of charisma, however, is surprising. The growth of new media technology has increased 
the opportunities for individuals to present themselves to their followers. Thus the growth 
of neopatrimonialism within modern institutions rests on charismatic individuals who not 
only dispense favours and services, but also can communicate with their clients. These 
charismatic individuals often work within their own sphere of influence.  
 
The crucial question rests on the endurance of patrimonialism in modern societies. 
Economic uncertainty necessitates the help of a powerful patron (Lemarchand and Legg, 
1972). As Bechelloni (1980: 233-4) states: 
 
‘In Italy… all cultural undertakings were economically fragile, requiring, with some 
exceptions, help from the state or from private patrons in order to survive. This had 
two important consequences: there never were many economically self-sufficient 
cultural or journalistic enterprises, and intellectuals and journalists… always lived in 
a state of financial uncertainty and hence enjoyed little autonomy. The state, which 
was in control of this situation, always had ample opportunities for manoeuvre and 
interference…’. 
 
This occurs clearly with Berlusconi who owns three of the four private television channels 
and his brother owns the national newspaper, Il Giornale. Similarly, La Stampa newspaper is 
owned by Fiat (and the Agnelli family). This economic uncertainty also occurs in Italian 
football. A financial crisis at the start of the twenty-first century highlighted that even the 
top clubs were in precarious financial situations. The structural inequalities of the league 
perpetuated financial fragility. Until 2010, each club negotiated their own television deal. 
Clubs like Juventus and AC Milan could command larger audiences and so negotiated more 
financially beneficial packages. Smaller clubs were left with fewer resources and the larger 
clubs exploited this situation through patronage in the player transfer system. 
 
The dense inter-related networks that cross football, politics and business also inhibit 
reform. The lack of legal-rational authority inhibits change. Although the judiciary are 
independent, they have been systematically undermined under the various governments of 
Silvio Berlusconi. The former prime minister has endured many prosecutions relating to 
financial issues (Ginsborg, 2004). Notwithstanding the fact that his governments shortened 
the statute of limitations on many of the laws relating to these, Berlusconi was found 
acquitted in all of these cases. Despite this, he regularly attacked the judiciary with 
comments like ‘You’d have to be mad to be a magistrate’ or ‘the judges are 
anthropologically different from the rest of the population’ (Ginsborg, 2004: 163). Further 
to this, the Berlusconi governments regularly utilised decree laws that circumvented 
parliamentary debate (Testa, 2013). Despite being the Prime Minister and technically the 
upholder of the law, the legal-rational system was systematically undermined in favour of 
personal interests.  
 
Patronage and Clientelism 
 
Whilst neopatrimonial describes the system, and pyramids provide a metaphor, in reality 
the system is permeated with individuals interacting within various networks. Therefore, the 
personalised and informal aspects of the networks are also vital in understanding how 
hegemonic power is sustained. Power flows through the neopatrimonial networks and 
depends on the relations between client and patron (Gellner 1977). Early anthropological 
studies illustrated the specific interpersonal relations between social actors within informal, 
often unequal, hierarchies (Weingrod, 1968). In particular, the notions of patronage and 
clientelism in Italy have received considerable attention (Banfield, 1958; Silverman, 1965; 
1975; 1977; Boissevain, 1966; Graziano 1976; Zuckerman 1977). Political scientists also 
identified how clientelism effectively became a way for the Christian Democratic party to 
effectively control Italy as a single-party state, or partitocrazia (partyocracy) (Tarrow 1967; 
Weingrod, 1968; Della Porta 1995; Ginsborg 1996; 2003). This was spectacularly exposed 
during the tangentopoli scandal of 1992 that revealed the neopatrimonial networks within 
Italian politics and led to the ultimate demise of the Prime Minister Bettino Craxi (Ginsborg 
2003). The calciopoli scandal reflected many similar neopatrimonial networks to 
tangentopoli, and despite Berlusconi’s skillful presentation to distance himself from the 
previous regime, these clientelistic practice continued (Author 2015).  
 
Clientelism and patronage are intimately related (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; 
Eisenstadt, 1973; Graziano 1976; Piattoni 2001; Erdmann and Engel, 2007) and show how 
reciprocal relationships between patrons and clients become established. For Piattoni 
(2001: 7), ‘Patronage and clientelism, then, are largely the same phenomenon with the 
latter being more penetrating and all-encompassing than the former... clientelism “implies” 
patronage… With clientelism, the emphasis is clearly put on the clients: how to win their 
vote, retain their support, command their allegiance’. Whereas patrons used to force their 
clients, under neopatrimonial systems, there is more negotiation and clients have some 
agency in choosing to yield to the patron.  
 
Fundamentally, clientelistic networks are informal, personal relationships where patrons 
and clients provide reciprocal favours. For Lemarchand and Legg (1972: 151-2),  
 
‘Political clientelism may be viewed as a more or less personalised, affective and 
reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal 
resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political 
ramification beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships’. 
 
This emphasises the relational and reciprocal aspects of clientelism and these still continue 
within neopatrimonial institutions. For Clapham (1985: 55), ‘Clientelism is indeed the 
application of the principles of neopatrimonialism to relationships between superiors and 
inferiors’. All political parties engage in patronage by utilising state resources for the benefit 
of their followers, whether they are tax cuts or public spending. The degree in which they 
are regulated by the legal-rational determines the distinction of whether they are seen as 
overtly patrimonial. Consequently, emphasis on independent legal-rational aspect helps to 
overcome the overtly patrimonial and charismatic. In this manner, clientelism is political 
support granted through dyadic relationships. 
 
The informal hierarchies established by patron-client relationships parallels the Church. 
Saints were seen as closer to God than the individual, and the clergy were closer to the 
saints. To gain access to God, one must negotiate through the intermediaries of the clergy 
and saints (Boissevain, 1966: 30). Putnam et al (1996), however, suggest that this 
phenomenon is limited to less ‘civic’ areas, in particular the Southern regions. Putnam 
argues that regions with a tradition of civic engagement are more co-operative, more 
democratic and less corrupt. This assertion completely disregards the two biggest scandals 
in Italian society in recent years. Both tangentopoli and calcipoli originated in the more 
‘civic’ north. As Luciano Moggi asserts in the title to this article, clientelism is common 
practise across the peninsula and not restricted to one person.  
 
There are certain key aspects of clientelistic relationships. As the diverse actors have access 
to different resources, the relationship is inherently unequal (Boissevan, 1966; Powell, 1970; 
Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). The inequality of the relationship helps ensure its durability; 
the client is indebted to the patron for goods or services (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). 
These relationships are not merely needy clients requesting support from friendly patrons. 
In some cases the patron utilises the unequal balance of power in the relationship to their 
advantage. Undoubtedly, the various family businesses that have bought into Italian football 
have financially, socially and politically benefited from the transactions they have exercised. 
The Tanzi family used Parma players to boost the image of Parmalat in South America, while 
Berlusconi has capitalised on the image of football to promote his political career (Porro and 
Russo, 2000; Ginsborg, 2004; Foot, 2006; Author, 2015).  
 
The example of calciopoli once again provides the apposite example of power being used to 
coerce the client to bend to the will of the patron. What the scandal demonstrated was that 
referees had been established as clients to Moggi. In Italy, referees are not randomly 
selected for matches but designated by a committee. The heads of this committee, Pierluigi 
Pairetto and Paolo Bergamo, were close friends of Moggi. Client referees were assigned to 
games of Juventus, or their rivals. They would overlook fouls by Juventus players, or 
sanction fouls on opponents. Once locked into the patron-client relationship, the referee 
was pressured to perform. Moggi was a close friend of Aldo Biscardi, the presenter of the 
longest running football show on Italian television. Moggi would call Biscardi to ask him not 
to show particular incidents of biased refereeing. If a referee did not comply then Moggi 
would ensure that all his errors were highlighted on television. Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
argue that journalists rely on a quid pro quo relationship with politicians in order to gain 
access to information. The same is true of football and television presenters. In return for 
fulfilling these requests, Moggi would use his contacts at Juventus and GEA World sports 
agency to provide exclusive guests for the show. Moggi would also resort to physical threats 
to coerce referees. In one example he shouted at the referee for not giving a penalty. Moggi 
himself was recorded as saying that ‘I locked the referee and linesmen in the toilet and took 
the keys away with me to the airport’ (Marcotti, 2006). 
 
Quid Pro Quo: The Importance of Reciprocity 
 
The success of the patron rests on their ability to grant favours to their clients. The greater 
the cliental network, the more opportunities can be bestowed elsewhere in the network; 
this improves the position of the client who profits from a powerful patron (Boissevain, 
1966; Boissevain 1974). Both parties legitimate the dyadic relationship through fulfilling 
their quid pro quo obligations. As Mauss (1967) demonstrates, the exchange of gifts is 
symbolic of future responsibilities. The gift places a duty on the receiver to return the favour 
in the future; there is no immediate responsibility to reciprocate, as Mauss (1967: 35) 
argues, ‘a necessarily implies the notion of credit’. Simmel (1950: 387) noted that,  
 
‘all contacts among men [sic] rest on the schema of giving and returning the 
equivalence… social equilibrium and cohesion do not exist without the reciprocity of 
service and return service… Beyond its first origin, all socialisation rests on a 
relationship’s effect which services the emergence of this relationship’. 
 
Effectively a ‘favour-bank’ is established. When a gift or favour is provided, the obligation 
must be fulfilled at some point in the future. As Barth (1966: 4) argues, 
 
‘each actor in a set of relationships keeps a kind of mental ledger of the value gained 
and lost in relation to other actors. Each subsequent action changes the balance and 
influences future behaviour. The less asymmetrical the relationships, the greater 
likelihood of the obligations remaining open-ended. Under conditions of near status 
equality, each transaction may be viewed as complete in itself’. 
 
As highlighted in the previous section, politicians provided favours in return for Moggi’s 
assistance. The importance of reciprocity is best illustrated in a phone conversation with a 
television presenter, Fabio Baldas, who was persuaded not to show a controversial penalty 
decision, 
 
‘Baldas: OK ... if I need a favour will you do me a favour? 
Moggi: No problem. 
Baldas: You'll call me back soon? 
Moggi: Yup, soon. 
Baldas: Fine, bye’ (La Repubblica, 2006). 
 
The succinct nature of this conversation highlights how there was a cultural understanding 
that a reciprocal favour would be provided. There was no immediate request for something 
in return, just an agreement that a phone call would be made soon.  
 
The key aspect of Mauss (1967) is that he identifies the importance of power in these social 
transactions. He identifies three key obligations within the ritual: giving the gift, receiving it, 
and repayment. The first obligation implies a position of power that not only the giver has 
something worthy of being given, but knows that this places the receiver into a subservient 
position. The familial nature of Italian capitalism also facilitates these reciprocal 
arrangements. As Moggi was an employee of Juventus, he could access staff discounts to 
cars from the club’s parent company, Fiat. He would pass these discounts onto those who 
granted him favours. In some cases he provided them as gifts. On one occasion, Moggi 
called the home of the Agnelli’s to request a Maserati sports car, made by a subsidiary of 
Fiat (Corriere della Sera 2006).  
 
Secondly, there is an obligation to accept the gift; refusal can lead to a loss of face or 
potentially provoking the ire of the ire of the giver. The president of Fiorentina, Diego Dalla 
Valle, was an outspoken critic of the hegemonic position of Juventus, Milan and Inter. He 
openly resisted the neopatrimonial network and his team ended up suffering as a result. 
The Florentine club were drawn into a relegation battle and Dalla Valle felt obligated to go 
to Moggi and request his favours. This retreat merely reinforces the power of the gift-giver 
and places them in a more powerful position.  
 
Finally, there is an implicit assumption that the gift will be returned. This is what makes gift-
giving within business so complicated. There have been numerous stories that imply gifts 
were provided to referees in return for future favours. While at Torino, Moggi was also 
accused of providing prostitutes for referees in 1992; although he claimed that they were 
interpreters and he was culpable if they hadn’t been used for his intended purpose. Twice, 
news stories surfaced about the (then) president of Roma who gave referees Rolex watches 
in 2000 and Christmas hampers and Krug champagne four years later (Author, 2015). Whilst 
Mauss’ conception of a gift is not expected to be value-free, it is also important to identify 
the wider power relationships. Sensi claimed these gifts were normal practise which had 
never been questioned in the past, so claimed that the stories were leaked to discredit him. 
Like Moggi subsequently, he claimed that everyone was guilty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Italian football is a complex network of neopatrimonial connections. There is an interlocking 
power elite of politicians, entrepreneurs and football club owners who utilise their personal 
connections to benefit their various sectors and maintain their hegemonic position as 
seenthrough the operation of power by Moratti, Moggi and Galliani. In turn, these help 
present a public image of the owner. They also provide opportunities for individuals to 
provide favours and exert influence. In Italy, three dominant clubs have established a 
hegemonic position: AC Milan, Inter and Juventus. All three are politically connected and 
owned by powerful businesses. All three were implicated in the calciopoli scandal in 2006. 
This scandal showed that each club had established a power network created to influence 
the results of their team. This was not for economic gain but the power and prestige of 
owning a successful football club and how this impacted their political standing. The 
metaphor of Lomnitz’s (1982) pyramids helps illustrate how each club developed their own 
power base. Yet these were not rigid structures; they were fluid. Brokers like Luciano Moggi 
acted as a node on an extensive network of politicians, agents, journalists, and 
administrators. Gifts and favours were exchanged to various clients throughout the network 
in return for support to Juventus.  
 
The importance of football as a form of social research is it is often integral to wider society 
not a separate entity. That said, this is not restricted to football and could apply in other 
corporate and cultural spaces, including the arts, television or leisure provision. Despite the 
magnitude of the scandal, and the financial crisis that preceded it, these problems seem 
structural within Italian football, business, and politics. The lack of independence of the 
authorities inhibits effective regulation and ensures hegemony. Patron-client relationships 
seem deeply embedded in various aspects of Italian society and this constrains 
development. As Lomnitz (1982: 67) argues,  
 
a reciprocity network is not merely a useful mechanism for obtaining certain 
resources: it is an end in itself... The entire system benefits from the existence of 
such contacts of an informal nature, which serve to contain and eliminate sources of 
conflict at all levels'. In this way, political stability is achieved. But more importantly, 
this stability ensures the elite groups remain in situ and others remain marginalised.  
 
The problem with Italian football is that patronage has become an end in itself. The lack of 
independent regulation inhibits the global development of the sport outside of Italy. Foreign 
investment has increased in Italy since Calciopoli, notably at Roma, Inter and Milan (Author 
2015). Time will tell if external influences can challenge the power bases of the major clubs.   
 
Acknowledgements 
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i Quote from Luciano Moggi, a central protagonist of the calciopoli scandal 
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